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224 pp., $21.95, hardcover.This book onworkingmemory limits by Klingberg (2009) is one to
which I certainly can relate. When I was in high school in the late
1960s, I decided that the only career that made sense for me, to
make the best use of a finite life span, was investigating the
scientific basis of human conscious experience. In graduate
school, I came to feel that two specialties could best satisfy
that aim: perception and working memory, the small amount
that can be kept in mind at once. There have been many exciting
advances in these two topics over the years, by both neuroscien-
tists and cognitive psychologists. So as to avoid solipsism, I also
wanted my research to be of practical use to medical science
and society. I could have gone various ways but ended up doing
behavioral studies of working memory and its development.
Klingberg’s title strikes a chord with me. In 2005, I published
a book on working memory capacity limits and their neural
underpinnings (Cowan, 2005). Originally, I planned to use the title
‘‘The full brain,’’ in allusion to a Far Side cartoon by Gary Larsen
in which a student asked to be excused from class because his
brain was full. The publisher felt that the title was not appropriate
for the series of scholarly essays of which mine was part. I had to
agree, given the emphasis on subtle theoretical distinctions and
the heavily referenced style; the ‘‘full brain’’ expression was used
instead within the first subtitle in my first chapter. Still, after all of
the work, I wistfully understood that I had not written a book for
everyone. It was for academics in my field, students in the
behavioral sciences, and potentially researchers from other
areas, but not so much for the public.
Now Torkel Klingberg (2008) has written an elegant scientific
book of the most accessible type with a like-minded title, The
Overflowing Brain. Among other things, he highlights his
research, which itself is of popular interest, demonstrating the
effect of training working memory on mental performance in
various people, including children with attention deficit disorder
and hyperactivity (ADHD) and aging adults. This type of research
finding offers an important challenge to the predominant, drug-
oriented maxims of modern medicine. The book is supported
by a lot of research literature, but the citations are neatly tucked
into a footnote section. That section is carefully coregistered with
the book pages, allowing themost relevant background informa-
tion to be found easily. Yet, the main text is fully comprehensible
even without reading the footnotes.The prospect of measuring the contents of the consciousmind
was important to even the first scientific investigators of
psychology. One of these was Wilhelm Wundt, who is often
credited with establishing the first laboratory of experimental
psychology in 1879. Strangely, his voluminous writings on
behavior and physiology have still only partly been translated
into English; Hungarian and Russian were more important at
the time. William James (1890), working at Harvard, helped
make the works of Wundt and others popular in the United
States, and he coined a term for the storage of information in
the human mind. He called it primary memory, conceived as
the trailing edge of the conscious present. As he further dis-
cussed, a complex human capability known as attention, which
is partly under the person’s voluntary control, helps to determine
which information is perceived and which of the perceived
events are considered further and retained for a while in primary
memory. Klingberg’s approach to working memory makes him
(like me) a benefactor of this early approach by Wundt, James,
and others. His present attention-based approach was never-
theless difficult to come by, in light of key events taking place
in the century following these early researchers. It has been
not so much an uninterrupted dynasty from the early days as
a renaissance. Here is what happened.
As the book indicates, modern research onworkingmemory is
generally considered to have begun with George Miller and his
observation in 1956 that experimental participants can repeat
back a list of no more than about seven separate items. The
book mentions the use of the term working memory by animal
researchers in the 1960s, but the term may have been used first
by Miller et al. (1960) to describe the memory by which humans
carry out plans, retaining the main goal in memory while various
subgoals are tackled.
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) then started a tidal wave of
research on working memory by arguing for a new theoreticalNeuron 62, April 16, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 13
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working memory to be a single thing, Baddeley and Hitch
persuasively argued that the evidence points to multiple, sepa-
rate working memory stores. In addition to an all-purpose
working memory store for abstract information, there was said
to be a separate store for phonological information (whether
from speech or print) and another for visual, spatial, nonverbal
information. Then, in the spirit of parsimony, Baddeley (1986)
omitted the general, abstract store for many years, though it
was still advocated by some (e.g., Cowan, 1988). Baddeley
(2000) was convinced that the evidence finally supported that
type of store. Most importantly, though, the phonological and vi-
suospatial stores of Baddeley andHitch were thought of as auto-
matically operating mechanisms that did not require attention
once the information was loaded in. So Klingberg’s return to an
emphasis on the importance of attention in working memory is
important.
There is also a long history regarding what aspects of working
memory can be trained (not much described in the book) and
conventional wisdom from this area, too, had to be overcome.
The consensus from the skill-training literature is that effects of
training, though sometimes remarkable, are specific to the skill
being trained.Themostdramaticexamplemaybe thecasestudies
of improved memory span beginning with Ericsson et al. (1980).
Over the course of a year, they trained an individual to increase
his digit span from seven items to about 80. It was done through
the application of specific practice. In a digit span task, a random
series of digits is presented, and the task is to repeat the series
in order. Span is defined as the longest list that can be repeated
with a particular rate of success (such as error-free repetition of
at least half the presented lists of that length). The participant in
Ericsson et al. already knew a large number of athletic records,
which served as prememorized, multidigit chunks. For example,
suppose that a list began, 8, 3, 4, 1, 9, 5, 8.. If he knew that
83.4 s is the world record time in one particular running event
and 195.8 is a national record number of feet in some throwing
event, then the series so far can be recoded as the two chunks
[83.4] [295.8], reducing the memory load from seven items to
two. The participant in this way increased his ability from about
seven items to about 20, reached a plateau, and then increased
further to 80 by learning to make higher-level chunks out of the
first-order chunks. Still, after all of this training, the ability to
perform a closely related but unpracticed task, letter span, re-
mained at about seven items.
The type of specific-skill training described by Ericsson et al.
(1980) and others seems to rely on the existence of a more
abstract form of working memory storage that can hold mean-
ingful units, including clusters of digits forming meaningful
chunks. This was consistent with George Miller’s concept of
chunking and with the abstract store already to be found in the
seminal sources in the field (e.g., Baddeley and Hitch, 1974).
The method of training, moreover, was thought to be one in
which specific knowledge about the material to be remembered
was put to use in forming the chunks. The new findings on
training highlighted by Klingberg (2008) would be seen as
surprising indeed, from that point of view. Hemaintains that chal-
lenging working memory training exercises can raise perfor-
mance on a variety of attention-demanding tasks, including intel-14 Neuron 62, April 16, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.ligence tests. Training effects are generalized, rather than just
task specific.
Klingberg (2008) also documents new research using brain
imaging techniques, which show that improvements in atten-
tion-related training are accompanied by enhanced activity in
a circuit of the brain that includes parts of the frontal and parietal
lobes. Actually, there is further evidence of specialization of func-
tion within this circuit, with the frontal areas having more to do
with the control of working memory and the parietal areas
more with the storage of information in working memory. Postle
et al. (2006) showed this using not only neuroimaging techniques
but also transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), which momen-
tarily impairs the stimulated part of the cortex. They found that
working memory tasks activate both the frontal and parietal
areas no matter whether these tasks require manipulation of
the rememberedmaterials (rearrangement of them or calculation
based on them) or memory with nomanipulation. TMS applied to
the parietal lobes impaired both sorts of task, but TMS applied to
the frontal lobes impaired only the tasks that included manipula-
tion of the materials.
Consistent with most of the recent literature, Klingberg (2008)
places considerable emphasis on the importance of filtering out
irrelevant information. This is important for the efficient func-
tioning of working memory, and Klingberg and his colleagues
even have identified brain areas in the prefrontal cortex and
basal ganglia that help do the job. Individuals with better working
memory appear to do a better job of filtering out irrelevant infor-
mation.
This emphasis on filtering has, however, underestimated the
role of individual differences in information storage. Illustrating
such differences, Gold et al. (2006) investigated memory for
spatial arrays of objects in normal and schizophrenic individuals
and found that the ability to filter less-relevant objects could not
account for differences between the groups. On a trial in one
experiment, for example, participants were usually tested on
memory for the orientation of one sort of object in a recently
seen array (such as one red bar out of several), though they
were occasionally tested on memory for the orientation of
another sort of object also in the array (such as one blue bar
out of several). Schizophrenic patients performed better on the
frequently tested objects, to the same extent that normal control
participants did. Still, the patients remembered far fewer of the
objects overall. As Klingberg (2008) noted, working memory for
spatial arrays of objects has been strongly linked to parietal
lobe areas limited to representing a few objects at a time, and I
would add that we should look for group differences in these
brain areas.
The book is well-organized and broad-ranging. After an
engaging introduction, the discussion turns to the mind as an
information portal, as in attention research (chapter 2), and the
mind as a mental workbench, as in working memory research
(chapter 3). Theoretical models of working memory are dis-
cussed (chapter 4), followed by a consideration of how the brain
may underlie capacity limits of working memory (chapter 5). In
this chapter, by the way, a fascinating point was that Albert Ein-
stein’s brain was enlarged in areas thought to underlie working
memory. The emphasis of the book then returned to models in
more depth, with a description of simultaneous capacity in
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tion with its own mental bandwidth (chapter 6).
In all of this, Klingberg establishes a position that differs from
the norm in the field. The norm (e.g., Baddeley, 1986) is to favor
the idea that there is a central executive faculty in the brain
responsible for coordinating different storage areas in working
memory. Conflicts between different tasks, like remembering
visual objects and sounds at the same time, would come from
the limit in how much the central executive can do. No conflict
is expected between a nonverbal visual task and a verbal task,
for example, except in the process of putting information into
each type of memory store. Instead, Klingberg favors the view
that there might be no such central executive processing limit.
The conflict between different working memory tasks could be
caused entirely by overlap in the neural circuits that would be
needed for the two tasks if they were performed one at a time.
To take this idea further, there appears to be a constant capacity
of about three to four items that applies even when the items
include disparate objects such as some colored squares and
some spoken digits, provided that information specific to a
sensory modality is wiped out by additional stimulation (Saults
and Cowan, 2007). Therefore, there may be a general capacity-
limited storage mechanism, such as the focus of attention
(Cowan, 1988, 2005).
Chapter 7 steps back to examine the evolutionary value of
working memory and its limits. This is an exciting topic; there
are many ideas as to why working memory limits exist, all still
unproven. One can focus on why a limit exists, as Cowan
(2005) does, or on why a larger limit is advantageous for survival
and reproduction, as Klingberg (2008) does. Working memory
apparently has increased over evolutionary time as societies
and technologies have become more complex. Given the need
for an economy of energy, not every stimulus can be processed
to the same level of detail, and it makes sense to have a
subsystem that provides expertise in determining which material
to give preferred treatment.
Many researchers have said that there is nothing as practical
as a good theory. The next few chapters set up the reader theo-
retically for the training studies to follow. Chapter 8 discusses
brain plasticity, the ability of the brain to grow, change, and get
rewired even in adulthood, which is much greater than
researchers used to think. It allows training of basic abilities.
Chapter 9 discusses attention deficit disorders as possibly not
medical diseases in need of drug treatments (with their inevitable
side effects), but rather as the extremes of a normal continuum of
attention styles. Attention function can be altered through inten-
sive training, which, it is hoped, can even alter the neurochemical
balance on which working memory depends.
In chapter 10, we are introduced to a laboratory-based
program to improve our working memory and attention capabil-
ities through training, and chapter 11 explores how to accom-
plish the same thing with everyday tasks. Chapter 12 discusses
computer games, indicating that the pitfalls that parents usually
fear (violence, loss of mental discipline) are balanced by possible
benefits of some of the games as attention-training regimens.
The added technological complexity of modern life may
explain why measures of intelligence are increasing all over the
world compared to previous generations (chapter 13, The FlynnEffect). The benefit is explained in neurochemical terms (chapter
14, Neurocognitive Impairment). Also, futuristic aids to
enhancing performance are discussed, such as computer
memory that would plug into the human brain. A broad and
enlightened perspective is taken. For example, people may fret
over the ethics of allowing college students to take memory-
enhancing drugs before a test but that mental angst tends to
disappear after the enhancing drug has been around for a while,
which is precisely the case with caffeine. Still, training of working
memory is cast as a better option than drugs.
In the final chapter on The Information Flood and Flow (chapter
15), the target for superior cognitive performance is identified as
the point at which one’s attention is absorbed by the task but one
remains in control. Challenges that are taken on push to the limit
one’s ability to cope, but do not hopelessly exceed that limit. At
this point, one gets the experience of ‘‘flow’’ in which it feels
good to work hard mentally, with full and efficient use of one’s
inspiration and creativity.
Not all of the conclusions in the book are for sure. For example,
the increase in IQ over time, the Flynn Effect, may not occur
because of the training effect. It could occur instead because
the tests no longer serve their original purpose. Tests of what
is called fluid intelligence, such as Ravens Progressive Matrices,
were designed to measure an individual’s ability to figure out
how to perform a novel task. Given that the characteristics of
such tasks are not very different from some computer games,
perhaps these tasks no longer seem novel to today’s young
test-takers. It may take some creativity to keep the intelligence
tests one step ahead of the populace.
There are parts of mental performance that have not been
handled very well by the field at large and, understandably
enough, are still not settled in the book. Consider the example
of remembering where one parked one’s car this morning.
Laymen often refer to that as short-term memory, whereas
cognitive psychologists reserve that term for information that
was held in mind only within the last minute or so. But then,
cognitive psychologists have no clear concept that can explain
why we can remember where we parked the car this morning.
The predominant concept in the literature is that there are cues
that help us to recall the most recent event in a series (in this
case, the series of parking spaces used on successive days).
An alternative formulation is that there is some intermediate-
term memory faculty, a notion that is common among neuro-
physiological researchers but rare among human behavioral
researchers.
Another issue that has not been addressed in enough detail by
the field, let alone in the book, is the massive influence of
emotion on cognition. What is seen as the human ability to be
rational is often actually no more than a human ability to ratio-
nalize and do or think what we want to.
The book has some general lessons. It shows how, through
persistence, a few people can successfully overturn established
scientific maxims, such as the one that says that the effects of
practice are only narrow and specific. It also shows the practical
value of theoretical thinking. A final lesson is the value of
combining literatures from fields that have remained separate;
probably for the sake of expedience, the neurologically and
behaviorally oriented researchers of attention and workingNeuron 62, April 16, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 15
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not talked to each other as much as they should. The book helps
to bring them together.
Finally, one can see in the book that there are important bene-
fits of not being too reductionistic in one’s scientific view. As an
analogy, to understand computers one must grasp not only the
functioning of magnetic memory locations, but also other,
higher-level concepts: information encoding, simple operations
and, at a macroscopic level, logical flow charts. Similarly but
further afield, to understand the United States government one
needs abstract concepts. One cannot point to a single part of
Washington, D.C., and say that it fully encapsulates the legisla-
tive, executive, or judicial branch; the physical plants are fairly
well commingled. Likewise, the intellect depends on faculties
such as working memory, attention, and planning that are
enacted in the brain by interwoven ensembles of neurons.
Discussions incorporating all levels of analysis are necessary,
and they occur in Klingberg’s book.
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